Essays Reflect on Brexit's Legacy but Overlook English Nationalism
This extensive compilation of essays by 43 contributors, including seven lords, four baronesses, one dame, and three knights of the realm, may represent the closest approximation to a semi-official reflection on the causes and consequences of Brexit. Edited by Sir Anthony Seldon, honorary historian at 10 Downing Street and author of definitive works on 21st-century British administrations, the collection spans 600 pages of analysis.
However, the term “English nationalism” appears only once, in a brief reference to the Daily Mail's stance during the 2016 referendum campaign. Notably, while there is a well-regarded essay by Aileen McHarg titled On Scotland, there is no corresponding essay On England. The book does not attempt to provide a broad overview of the tensions, contradictions, and anxieties within non-metropolitan England, the part of the UK where Brexit was won. This omission suggests that Englishness remains a subject largely unspoken within much of the political and intellectual establishment.
This absence is significant not only for understanding recent history but also for the UK's immediate future. It sidesteps the critical question: why, despite many Brexit voters now viewing it as a failure, is the figure most responsible for its success still a credible candidate for prime minister?
Public Sentiment and Political Influence
Peter Kellner’s insightful essay reveals that one-third of Leave voters now consider Brexit a failure, and strikingly, a quarter of these voters hold Nigel Farage “very” responsible for their disappointment. More voters blame Farage than the European Union itself. Despite this, Farage continues to influence English and, to some extent, Welsh politics.
Yet, if a respected historian like Seldon does not address the nationalist impulses behind Brexit, Farage’s ongoing success remains difficult to explain. The collection lacks a dedicated essay on Farage, making it akin to a Punch and Judy show without Mr Punch.
Economic Impact and Political Reality
It is widely accepted that Brexit has been an objective failure. Research from Stanford University indicates that by 2025, Brexit had reduced UK GDP by 6% to 8% compared to projected levels without Brexit. Investment declined between 12% and 18%, while employment and productivity decreased by 3% to 4%.
Despite optimistic rhetoric about a new golden age, many intelligent Brexit supporters anticipated such economic consequences. Their belief was that economic hardship was a price worth paying for political renewal. The slogan “taking back control” encapsulated this view, suggesting political sovereignty was the primary goal, with economic considerations secondary.
However, as jurist and historian Jonathan Sumption notes in his critical introduction,
“Britain’s own ability to exercise ‘control’ over its own fate is inevitably more limited outside the EU.”
The UK remains significantly affected by EU decisions without having a voice in them. Regarding immigration, often cited by voters as evidence of lost control, Migration Observatory director Madeleine Sumption points out in her essay that immigration actually rose to record levels after Brexit, meaning Brexit failed “spectacularly to deliver on its clearest promise.”
Thus, voters who exchanged economic growth for sovereignty received poor outcomes on both fronts. Brexit did not result in the emergence of a liberated governing class. Former pro-Brexit Tory MP Conor Burns humorously describes Simon Case, the cabinet secretary appointed by Boris Johnson, as “lightweight” and suggests that was the reason for his appointment.
Case himself appears in the collection to share responsibility:
“The vision of a nation released from the shackles of Brussels bureaucracy rapidly became a reality of muddled thinking, fruitless negotiations, Parliamentary quagmire and administrative confusion.”
Douglas Carswell, veteran anti-EU campaigner and former Ukip MP, concludes pessimistically:
“Vote Leave might have gained us self-government. We have yet to govern ourselves well.”
With six prime ministers since 2016 and a seventh anticipated, questions arise about the governability of post-Brexit Britain.
Disappointment and Political Consequences
Disappointment was inherent in Brexit’s nature. It was doomed to become an immediate lost cause—a mirage dissipating upon approach. As Carswell states,
“we still have the European disease.”
Gisela Stuart, former Labour MP and prominent Leave campaigner, believes Britain remains “still overshadowed by the ghosts of fifty years of EU membership.” Paul Stephenson, Vote Leave’s communications director, describes the victory as “bittersweet”:
“We wrestled victory out of the jaws of defeat, but then promptly allowed it to be snatched back off us again.”
Among Brexit supporters, there is little acknowledgment of their own failures. Burns refers to the Irish border issue as “the problems the Irish had created,” seemingly unaware that Northern Ireland voted to remain and that the Irish government opposed Brexit.
Economist Patrick Minford, who predicted a golden age, writes with Zheyi Zhu that while “in the short run Brexit is bound to cause disruption,” its purpose is “to improve long-run performance.” Adapting John Maynard Keynes’ perspective, one might wonder if the long-term benefits will be realized only after current Leave voters have passed away. Economists Paul Johnson and Robert Johnson argue that “it seems unlikely that the long term hit to national income will be less than 4 per cent, and it might well be more.”
Identity Crisis and the English Question
The book offers little evidence that Remain supporters are better equipped to confront the identity crisis underlying Brexit. Neuroscientist Susan Greenfield acknowledges that
“the all-important question of whether to leave or remain in the EU was somehow tied in with our identity.”
However, she approaches identity primarily from a cognitive perspective, which, while fascinating, highlights the absence of any concrete political or social analysis of this “somehow.”
For a more detailed understanding, one must look to ongoing surveys by political scientists Ailsa Henderson and Richard Wyn Jones. Their research finds that supporters of Farage prioritize “being English” above “being a parent” as a key aspect of their identity.
Those who view Englishness as central to their identity were dissatisfied in 2016 and remain so. Henderson and Wyn Jones observe that they are
“deeply conscious of what they clearly regard as a jarring contrast between past glories and a present brought-low; an England whose eponymous national group seems to feel besieged both from within and without; an England that has secured major changes (not least, Brexit) in order to assuage its concerns, yet remains deeply dissatisfied with the results.”
Brexit was a misguided and self-damaging response to the English question. Yet the political and intellectual elites appear reluctant even to acknowledge this issue, let alone offer a better solution.
