Robbins Details Pressure to Expedite Mandelson’s Appointment
The dismissed senior civil servant Oliver Robbins has revealed he faced “constant pressure” upon joining the Foreign Office to expedite Peter Mandelson’s appointment as the UK ambassador to the United States.
Robbins stated that the Cabinet Office urged the Foreign Office to approve Mandelson’s appointment without the standard vetting process. However, the Foreign Office resisted this pressure, and the vetting was eventually conducted.
In a significant development, Robbins, who was dismissed by Keir Starmer last week after overturning a UK Security Vetting (UKSV) ruling, indicated he made his decision without full knowledge of the national security concerns related to Mandelson.
The former permanent secretary granted clearance without reviewing the UKSV form, which indicated a “high” overall concern and recommended “clearance denied,” nor was he aware of the detailed issues.
Robbins also corroborated ’s report that senior government officials debated releasing sensitive documents about the vetting process to Parliament, a claim denied last week by Darren Jones, the prime minister’s chief secretary.
Starmer has faced intense scrutiny over the appointment process of Mandelson, with many MPs criticizing the prime minister’s political judgment. Robbins’ testimony is viewed as pivotal in influencing whether these MPs continue to support Starmer or move against him, potentially precipitating an early end to his premiership.
In his testimony to the foreign affairs select committee on Tuesday, Robbins confirmed he did not inform Starmer, David Lammy (then foreign secretary), or anyone else in No 10 about UKSV’s initial decision.
Robbins disclosed that No 10 requested the Foreign Office to expedite security clearance for the prime minister’s then communications chief, Matthew Doyle, and instructed him not to inform Lammy.
Starmer appointed Mandelson before Robbins assumed his role as Foreign Office chief and prior to security vetting. Senior officials told it was evident that No 10 intended for Mandelson to be in Washington regardless of the risks.
Robbins explained that before his appointment, there was an active debate on whether Mandelson should undergo vetting. His predecessor, Philip Barton, had to be “very firm in person” to ensure vetting was conducted.
He told the committee that Downing Street adopted a “dismissive” stance toward vetting. Mandelson was granted access to the Foreign Office building, low-classification IT systems, and “higher-classification briefings” before receiving security clearance.
“I walked into a situation in which there was already a very, very strong expectation. And you have seen the papers released already under the humble address that’s coming from No 10 that he needed to be in post and in America as quickly as humanly possible. The very first formal communication of this to my predecessor from Number 10 private office being that they wanted all this done at pace and Mandelson in post before inauguration.”
When asked who in No 10 applied pressure, Robbins identified the prime minister’s private office, staffed by civil servants, but suggested they were likely under pressure themselves.
Robbins’ Handling of UKSV Findings
In a letter to the committee prior to his testimony, Robbins stated he received an oral briefing on the UKSV findings in January, reportedly from Ian Collard, the department’s chief property and security officer, without any documents.
He described Mandelson’s case as “borderline,” with UKSV leaning toward recommending clearance denial.
During his evidence, Robbins said he was unaware of the tick-box form that recommended denying clearance.
“I was told that it was borderline and that they were leaning against recommending against,”he said.
“I don’t remember anybody at any stage saying anything different to me, certainly not about red boxes.”
He added,
“Before the government chose to publish it, I’ve never seen a form like that. I certainly do not recall the way in which the UKSV findings were presented to me as being that definitive.”
The Foreign Office’s security team, the Estates Security and Network Directorate, believed the risks could be managed and mitigated. Robbins noted UKSV acknowledged the Foreign Office might grant clearance with these mitigations.
When questioned by Emily Thornberry, committee chair, on why he did not request the vetting document, Robbins explained he preferred oral briefings to maintain confidentiality.
Robbins stated in his letter that he considered requesting the UKSV recommendation contents in September after Mandelson’s dismissal but chose not to, despite being informed there was a national security justification.
“It is deeply worrying that within days of [Cabinet Office] officials briefing No 10 on the issues they perceived with Mandelson’s vetting, the story had leaked to .”
Robbins maintained he did not inform anyone in No 10 about the UKSV recommendation, supporting the prime minister’s assertion that neither he nor his aides were aware.
Asked if he was tempted to inform senior officials such as then cabinet secretary Chris Wormald or chief of staff Morgan McSweeney, Robbins replied,
“No, absolutely not. My understanding of custom practice and guidance is that the decision making within the box of the vetting process must remain entirely confidential.”
Challenges of Denying Clearance and Internal Disputes
Robbins acknowledged it would have been “very difficult indeed” to deny Mandelson security clearance.
“The PM’s nominee had been put out there to the public, announced, blessed by the king, agreed by the US government. We were in receipt of formal letters from No 10 telling us to get on with it quickly. We had engineered agreement to arrive just before the inauguration.
All I can do is agree with the premise that against that backdrop, the Foreign Office saying ‘OK but sorry, we can’t grant him clearance’ would have been a very, very difficult problem. And a difficult problem I would have been landing the foreign secretary with, and the prime minister.”
Senior government officials, including those in the Cabinet Office, were involved in a live dispute last week over whether to release documents related to Mandelson’s vetting via the parliamentary process.
Robbins stated,
“I would not resile for a second from the Foreign Office’s position in that conversation and I’m not trying to hide from it. I certainly held this view, but I was also advised it was the correct view, and others in the Foreign Office took it too. And we were not alone in Whitehall in taking this position.
To open that box is to do something that has long-term, damaging and chilling implications for UK national security. I will not hide from the fact that my department, including me, took that view in those internal discussions.”
He continued,
“This was a debate about whether the Cabinet Office opened their own safe, and in the end they chose to do so. I would still have wished that they didn’t … because of all of the factors I’ve tried to lay out for you this morning, and consistently, we continue to advise that they shouldn’t.
I think at various points in this story … they were quite convinced by that view. I mean, I certainly recall being debriefed on meetings with the Cabinet Office in which they had been very worried about the implications of opening the box.”
